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Abstract: Current study empirically investigates the impact of institutional ownership on discretionary 
accruals; we took a sample size of 68 listed non -financial companies from a population of 652 companies 
listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). This data was gathered for the period of 5 years, starting from 2006 
up to 2010. Modified Jones Model was employed for this study to quantify discretionary accruals while 
institutional ownership measured by dividing number of shares kept by institutions from total number of 
shares outstanding. The fix effect model showed that the magnitude of discretionary accruals in Pakistani 
listed firms tends to significantly decrease for the firms where institutions hold a decent amount of share of 
that particular firm. Thus the findings of this study are in consensus with our hypothesis, which proposes that 
institutional ownership is quite an effective tool in aligning insider management and administration to take 
the right decision for value maximizing of the companies, and thus shareholders.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to thoroughly examine the relationship between institutional ownership and 
discretionary accrual in the Pakistani listed non-financial firms. The differentiation of ownership and control 
in firms is a reality in today’s business environment, where for a diversified portfolio, the huge amount of 
insignificant shareholders of a firm are also shareholders of many other listed firms. This keeps the investor 
farthest from even the concept of ownership while assuming maximum profit. As greater number of 
companies is listed on stock exchanges, the growing differentiation creates a serious conflict between the 
owners of a firm and the managers (Ali et al, 2008). One such entity among stakeholders is that of the 
Institutional Owners. These entities comparatively have higher stakes in the company, and thus are highly 
interested in its better internal control. Dorothy et al (2003) suggests that institutional ownership engages as 
a vital part in the corporate governance structure of the firm, as the institutional investors are open to vide 
range of resources to govern managers in relation to small individual investors. This makes them are more 
effective in persuading board to perform better. Having this high emphasis on control is primarily because 
managers in most cases opt for a creative way of reporting financial statements. Here management is 
determined, and puts in a continuous effort to find loopholes in the financial reporting standards. This is led 
by the managements yearning to project earnings at a desired level, while following a valid pattern that will 
let them adjust the financial figures as far as is practicably possible and significantly benefitting (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). However, this is done in compliance with, the accounting practices, which are valid, and 
follow the book of standard accounting practices, but is not in coherence with the thought and spirit with 
which these rules were penned down.  
 
This opportunity of discretionary accrual is like an open option for the firms to practice as per to GAAP 
principles. By this creative accounting, the managements do not present the true information through their 
company’s financial statements. This is done to provide favorable management and company information to 
the stakeholders about the economic performance of their companies. This is done in order to negate all of its 
possible cons, and to realize forecasted benefits. Lev (1989) suggested that a positive view of earning depicts 
a positive surge in the total worth of the firm, and vice versa. Assuming that the better the value of the firm, 
the better rewarded is the management. Thus, discretionary accrual is considered as an extremely important 
issue in our current accounting practices. This usually comprises of the simulated increase or decrease in 
earnings, profits, or in revenues, which is done through manipulative accounting strategies. Earnings are 
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specially managed in the case where the company is victim to losses. This is done to show the company in a 
favorable situation to the investors (Hayn, 1995). This in turn raises questions over the integrity of the 
financial statements, but until the time these speculations do not defy the confines of accounting practices, 
they cannot be reported as illegal. The contribution of this study is to explore the effect of institutional 
ownership on discretionary accrual within the public listed firms. Remaining portion of study includes 
literature of previous studies, methodology to calculate discretionary accruals and institutional ownership, 
analysis and conclusion.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Discretionary Accrual: Beneish (2001) suggested that there is a deficiency in consent over the definition of 
discretionary accrual. Schipper (1989) cited in his study, defining discretionary accrual as “intentional actions 
by the management while remaining within the bounds of GAAP to project a preferred level of income”. 
According to prior researches, discretionary accrual is a common practice (Scott 1998).  Schipper (1989) 
defines discretionary accrual as the desired and meaningful mediation into the financial reporting process to 
maximize personal gains. Discretionary accrual takes place in following three ways, firstly by constructing of 
desired for revenue and/or expense activities, secondly due to differing accounting practices changing from 
company to company and thirdly by managing the accruals (Schipper 1989). There are two perspectives on 
discretionary accruals; the opportunistic perspective and the information perspective. Opportunistic 
perspective proposes that management tries to deceive the investors, whereas the information perspective is 
the one in which manipulation by managers is a means for management to project for investors their 
personal expectations considering a company’s future cash flows. Many previous studies have derived 
assumptions based on opportunistic perspective, while discarding the information perspective (Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1983). 
 
Institutional Ownership: Institutional financiers are the major chunk of investors in the market, other than 
those few influential individuals who exercise discretion over the investment of others. Organizations taken 
to be as institutional investors includes insurance firms, pension funds, trust institutions, financial firms also 
including investment firms, and other companies selected and allied with the above named institutions (Lang 
and McNichols,1997). It has taken as beneficial for the entire governance practices of the company, as 
institutional investors are open to more resources to regulate managerial activities in relation to the large 
number of insignificant individual investors. A very vital part is acted upon by the institutional owners of the 
firm's corporate governance structure (Dorothy et al 2003); concerning the fact that they are, more effective 
in imposing had better board performance. Agency theory suggests that controlling shareholders often use 
their power to undertake activities intended to obtain private gain in relation minority shareholders who 
cannot exercise that power (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Discretionary Accruals and Institutional Ownership: Quite a few researches have focused on the 
association of the ownership structure with discretionary accruals. Whereas, most of the researchers 
maintained their dedication towards the influence of board practices and its characteristics on the earnings 
management, while having just a few studies to have incorporated ownership structure with discretionary 
accrual. Those few researches conducted even pose a lack of consensus. As per to our awareness, a study 
conducted by Shah et al (2009) found a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
discretionary accrual with corporate governance variables. Contrary to that, Fayoumi et al (2010), suggests 
there is no universal conformity concerning the impact of ownership structure on discretionary accruals. 
Adding to contrary, Frank (2006) proposed two categories for the governance variables i.e. internal and 
external. Internal variables groups up board structure with ownership concentration, while the external 
variables comprises of the takeover pressure on a company and its institutional ownership pattern. His 
research disclosed that the firms with much steady internal governance body feel more secure to perform 
discretionary accruals in relation to the firms with steadier external governance body. However, more 
researches regarding corporate ownership structure and discretionary accrual are briefly discussed in the 
literature below. The aptitude of managers to manage earnings is controlled by the usefulness of exterior 
monitor such as institutional ownership and block-holders ownership. These types of monitoring imply less 
occasion for managing the accruals (Yeo et al. 2002). 
219 
 
 Wong et al. (2009) conducted a research to verify the part played by the outside directors and the 
institutional shareholders in limiting discretionary accrual events within construction, industrial and 
consumer industries of Malaysia. Their results revealed that no significant relationship exists between the 
intensity of discretionary accruals and institutional ownership. Examining the same relationship, Hsu and 
Koh (2005) concluded that institutional investors having long-term intentions of ownership influence 
aggressive earnings management practices in the end. However, they also suggested that association between 
institutional ownership and discretionary accruals depends entirely on the context in which the firms are 
taken in consideration for the study. Koh (2003) empirically tested the association of institutional ownership 
with discretionary accruals. His results revealed that with the increase in institutional ownership, the degree 
of earnings manipulation decreased, and vice versa. These results are consistent with my hypothesis; along 
with the view that institutional owners having long-term investment intentions act to nullify managers’ 
aggressive attitude towards earnings manipulation. Further, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, (1998); and Cheng 
and Reitenga, (2000), through their study proposed that high motivation to monitor a firms management 
exists, where institutional owners have intended invest in firms for a long period. This study here is to add 
content to the existing body of knowledge, including previous researches and theories. This research here is 
as extension as to further pave the way for better understanding the impact of institutional ownership on 
discretionary accruals of the public listed companies.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
Sample: To empirically test the impact of institutional ownership on discretionary accruals, i took a sample 
size of 68 listed companies from a population of 652 companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). We 
excluded the companies whose complete information was not available. Further, financial institutions were 
also kept out of the study due to their being different in capital structure and returns compared to other 
industries (Shah et al. 2009). The data was gathered online from various websites of the listed companies 
which were interlinked with Karachi Stock Exchanges’ and Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan’s’ 
website. 
 
Hypothesis 
HO = Institutional Ownership does not affect discretionary accruals. 
H1  = Institutional Ownership structure causes a decrease in discretionary accruals. 
 
Calculation of Variables: The variables of study in focus are; 
 Discretionary Accruals (DA) 
 Institutional Ownership (IO) 
 Asset Size of the company (AS) 
 And, Return on Equity (RoE) 
 
Where, discretionary accrual (DA) also known as earnings management is the dependent variable, having 
Institutional Ownership (IO) impacting it as an independent variable. The other two variables in the study are 
control variables. Now as for the calculations of the variables, following procedures have been taken in 
consideration; 
 
Discretionary Accruals (Earnings Management): Consistent with previous studies, Total Accruals (TA) is 
needed to get DA. TA can be calculated using two methods, which are as follows; 
 Balance Sheet Approach (BSA) 
 Cash Flow Statement Approach (CFSA) 
 
Balance Sheet Approach method was used by (Healy & Wahlen, 1998) and (Jones, 1991) to calculate TA in 
their studies, but for this study, we used CFSA. This approach is being taken in consideration due to the 
citation of Collins and Hriber (1999), by Shah et al (2009), which suggest that BSA is inferior to CFSA 
considering some circumstances. Where TA was considered as DA in BSA calculations, but tempering in 
earnings exists in case where the management has the option to influence the earnings. Therefore, CFSA 
distributes TA into sort of accruals;  
 Discretionary Accruals (DA) 
 Non-Discretionary Accruals (NDA) 
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So in this regards where TA and NDA are calculable, NDAs are deducted from TAs, which results in DAs. As 
per to the CFSA, the formula is as given bellow; 
  𝐷𝐴𝑇 = 𝑇𝐴𝑇 −  𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑇 −  −  −  −  −  −(𝐼) 
 Where, 
  DAT = Discretionary Accruals at time T 
  TAT = Total Accruals at time T 
  NDAT = Non-Discretionary Accruals at time T 
 Now find TA, following formula is put to use; 
   𝑇𝐴𝑇 =  𝑁𝐼𝑇 −  𝑁𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑇 −  −  −  −  −  −(𝐼𝐼) 
 Where, 
  NOCFT = Net Operating Cash Flow at time T 
  NIT  = Net Income at time T 
Further, NDA is calculated through Modified Cross-Sectional Jones Model (1995), which is as give bellow;  
𝑁𝐷𝐴 =  𝛽𝑂  
1
𝐴𝑆𝑇−1
 +  𝛽1   
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑇 − ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑣𝑇
𝐴𝑆𝑇−1
 + 𝛽3   
∆𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑇
𝐴𝑆𝑇−1
 +  𝜀 −  −  −  −(𝐼𝐼𝐼)  
 Where, 
  β  = Parameters of the equation 
  AST-1 = Asset size at time T less Asset size at time T-1 
  ∆RevT = Revenue at time T less revenue at time T-1 
  ∆RecvT= Receivables at time T less receivables at time T-1 
  ∆PPET = Property, Plant & Equipment (PPE) at time T less PPE at time T-1 
  E = Residual 
 
Institutional Ownership: To calculate institutional ownership (IO) of each company for the certain year, we 
opted for to find out two important variables of each company, which determine the share of institutional 
owners in a company for that year. This data was gathered for the period of 5 years, starting from 2006 up to 
2010. The formula of IO is as follows; 
𝐼.𝑂 =  
𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑇
𝑇𝑆𝑂𝑇
−  −  −  −  −  −(𝐼𝑉) 
Where, 
  TSIOT =  Total shares of IO at time T 
  TSOT =  Total shares outstanding at time T 
  TSIOT =  Total IO at time T 
 
Control Variables: The control variables of the study are Asset Size of the firm (AS), and, Return on Equity 
(ROE). These variables are to be calculated as follows; 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝐴𝑆 = 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 log 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
A natural log of total assets has been taken for this study due to the reason that all companies asset size varies 
by a huge scale. This makes the companies incomparable. Therefore, to overcome this scenario and make the 
companies comparable with each other, we applied natural log to the value of these total assets. 
 
Hausmen Test and Fixed Effect Model: To estimate the impact of IO on DA, we applied fixed effect model 
(FEM) as the data was a panel data. This was further favored as the best model for the estimation by applying 
Hausmen test to the data, which rolled the dice in favor of FEM, giving a significant chi-square value for FEM. 
The FEM identified for estimation is as given bellow; 
𝐷𝐴𝑇  =  𝛽𝑂 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑂𝑇 +  𝛽2  𝐴𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑇  +  𝜇 −  −  −  −  −  −(𝑉) 
Where, 
 β  = Parameters of the equation 
 DAT = Discretionary Accruals at time T 
 IOT = Institutional Ownership at time T 
 AST = Asset size at time T 
 ROET = Return on Equity at time T 
 µ =  Unidentified Variations 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
In order to apply any tests to this data for an empirical study, I first needed to identify the type of data under 
analysis, the outcomes of which is as given below in table 1.  The descriptive stats below show the total 
number of observation of the panel data, along with the variables mean values, and the variation existing 
within each variable of the data. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Discretionary Accruals (DA) 340 0.1123737 0.2126623    
Institutional 0wnership (IO) 340 0.5258768 0.3239274  
Asset Size (AS) 340 22.48264 1.4839070  
Return on Equity (ROE) 340 -0.0647718 2.7527180  
 
As for the Table 2, it shows the correlation between the variables, that is, of the independent variables with 
the dependent and independent variables. This is done to check whether multi-co-linearity exists between 
the variables or not. If so the factor of multi-co-linearity exists, the data needs to be fixed. Here it is clearly 
visible that no such factor of multi-co-linearity exists. This allows us to proceed with the other test for 
estimation of the data to identify the impact of institutional ownership on discretionary accruals. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Analysis 
  DA IO AS ROE 
DA 1.0000    
IO 0.0015   1.0000   
AS 0.1270   0.1409 1.0000  
ROE -0.0098 0.0700 -0.0713 1.0000 
 
When we estimated the data through fixed effect modeling, the data had been grouped into sixty-eight 
individual groups (companies) for a period of five years. The product of which stood out to be a decent 340 
observations. Those observations as from the results of data estimation implies that the impact of 
institutional ownership and asset size significantly impacts on discretionary accruals at 85% confidence 
interval, while giving a 15% levy for variations from the estimated results. On the contrary, the ROE and the 
debt to equity ratio show no significant impact on the discretionary accruals.  
 
Table 3: Fixed Effect Model (FEM) 
DA Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
IO -0.1371182 0.0868796 -1.58 0.116 
AS 0.0622067 0.01808 3.44 0.001 
ROE -0.0118981 0.0183453 -0.65 0.517 
R2    0.0490 
F-Stats & Probability   3.4500 0.0090 
Note: Significant at 85% confidence interval. 
 
Further, the value of the R2 reveals that the model is not the best one, but this is due to the formation of data 
in the panel form. Due to this reason, the R2 would never give a favorable result for the appropriateness of the 
model. Therefore, for that reason, we take F-stats and its probability, which suggests that the model is 
appropriate, and the parameters (variables) on a collective level significantly affect discretionary accruals. 
The results show that our hypothesis H1 stands true. That where the share a of institutional ownership 
increases in a company, the less does the manipulation of earnings takes place. This implies that the results 
are in line with the previous theories or studies, where the norm is that the firms with a concerned 
institutional ownership make the management practice less discretionary accruals comparatively (Frank, 
2006, & Shah et al, 2009). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Having gone through a thorough empirical analysis, we draw a conclusion that in Pakistan, institutional 
ownership has a negative impact on discretionary accruals. Suggesting that the companies in Pakistan are 
getting more aware of corporate governance along with which role of institutional owners has also expanded 
its borders. Institutional owners are now taken as a vital mediator for improving practices in corporate 
governance. This reveals that the institutional owners in reality perform the job of a watchdog making it 
difficult for the management to alter the earnings for any desired purpose. This also ensures that governance 
authority for self-benefiting interest of institutional owners also indirectly looks after the interest of minority 
shareholders in Pakistan. 
 
References 
 
Ali, S. M., Salleh, N. M. & Hassan, M. S. (2008). Ownership Structure and Earnings Management in Malaysian 
Listed Companies: The Size Effect. Asian Journal of Business and Accounting, 1(2), 89-116. 
Beneish, M. (2001). Earnings Management: a perspective. Managerial Finance, 27(3). 
Cheng, C. A. & Reitenga, A. (2000). Institutional Investors and Discretionary Accruals, Paper presented at the 
2nd AAA/BAA Globalization Conference. Cambridge: UK. 
Collins, D. & Hribar, P. (1999). Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical research. Working 
Paper. University of Iowa. 
Dorothy, A., Feldmann, D. & Schwarzkopf. L. (2003). The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Board and Audit 
Committee Composition. Review of Accounting and Finance, 2(4), 87–109 
Frank, Y. (2006). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management. Working paper, version: June.  
Fayoumi, N. A., Abuzayed, B. & Alexander, D. (2010). Ownership structure and Earnings Management in 
Emerging Markets: The Case of Jordan. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 38, 
28-47. 
Hayn, C. (1995). The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 125-153. 
Healy, P. M. & Wahlen, J. M. (1998). A review of the earnings management literature and its implication for 
standard setting, Harvard Working Paper. 
Holthausen, R. W. & Leftwich, R. W. (1983). The economics consequences of accounting choice. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 5(2), 77-117. 
Hsu, G. C. M. & Koh, P. S.  (2005). Does the Presence of Institutional Investors Influence Accruals 
Management? Evidence from Australia. Corporate Governance, 13(6). 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during important relief investigations. Journal of accounting 
research, 29, 193-228. 
Koh, P. S. (2003). On the Association between Institutional Ownership and Aggressive Corporate Earnings 
Management in Australia. The British Accounting Review, 35, 105–128.  
Lang, M. & McNicholas, M. (1997). Institutional Trading and Corporate Performance. Research Paper, 
Stamford University. 
Lev, B. (1989). On the Usefulness of Earnings and Earnings Research: Lessons and Directions from Two 
Decades of Empirical Research. Journal of Accounting Research, 27, 153-201. 
Rajgopal, S. & Venkatachalam, M. (1998). The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: An 
Empirical Investigation. Working paper, Stanford University.  
Schipper, K. (1989). Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 3, 91-102. 
Scott, R. W. (1998). Financial Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Shah, Z. A., Zafar, N. & Durrani, T. K. (2009). Board Composition and Earnings Management an Empirical 
Evidence Form Pakistani Listed Companies. Middle Eastern Finance and Economics, 3(29), 30-44. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(1), 737–783. 
Watts, R. L. & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood Clifts: Prentice Hall. 
Wong, S. Y., Loo, S. C. & Shamsher, M. R. (2009). The Effect of Board Structure and Institutional Ownership 
Structure on Earnings Management. Master’s thesis, University Putra Malaysia. 
Yeo, G., Tan, P., Ho, K. & Chen, S. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the in formativeness of earnings. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29, 1023-1046. 
